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In this paper, we explore how narrative loss may impact upon one’s sense of 
self and the spiritual process of meaning-making and purpose. We argue that 
we are narrative beings that make sense of our selves and our social, physical, 
and ideational worlds in and through narrative and that this process, which 
involves matters of purpose, truth, and values, is at one and the same time a 
spiritual activity, as both spirituality and narrative involve a sense of openness 
and indeterminacy, and the generation of meaning and purpose. As we age, 
however, physical, mental and social changes may disrupt how we narrativize 
our lives, and social and ideological (or meta-) narratives might frame what 
stories we can tell, and how we can tell them, in ways different from the past. 
We explore some of the narrative losses associated with aging and then, 
drawing on practices in spiritual direction, discuss some possible ways of 
countering such losses, in particular the development of narrative literacy, the 
re-ignition of narrative desire, the making of narrative connections, and the 
deepening of autobiographical reasoning. In this way, we hope to illustrate how 
narrative works in the spiritual lives of older adults. 
 
 
Our starting point is that storytelling is part and parcel of being 
human. “We are story-narrating animals, ceaselessly creating stories and 
dwelling in story-telling societies” (Plummer, 2013, p. 209). Further, the 
stories we tell construct and reconstruct our lives, bringing personal chaos 
into order (Plummer, 2013). This process of narrativization—that is, 
shaping our lives through storying—spans all aspects of our lives and as 
such is deeply important to our sense of self, our understanding of others, 
and our functioning in the world. Narrative as a meaning-making 
process—articulating goals and purposes, and inscribing truth and 
values—is, we suggest, a spiritual activity, and here we are interested in 
the links between narrative, spirituality, and aging. 
As we age, however, changes in ourselves and in how others see 
us may constrain or curtail the narrativization process. We may become 
less able to construct our lives narratively and may have fewer 
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opportunities to do so. Further, societal metanarratives of aging may 
corral the types of stories that we can tell or that can be told about us. 
These threats to the narrativization process we call narrative loss. 
In what follows, we seek to explore these themes: the narrative 
self, spirituality as a narrative process, narrative loss, and what we might 
do in order to address those losses, to narratively repossess those whose 
stories are under threat. This is a preliminary sketch, designed to raise 
questions about the nature of the issues and proffer a tentative suggestion 
of what might be done.  
 
Narrative and the Self 
 
There has been much written on the relationship between narrative 
and the self. Much of the extensive literature on the subject can be located 
within two very broad traditions. In the first tradition, narrative is viewed 
as reflecting the self and as a means, therefore, of gaining access to the 
self, providing a sort of window onto the world of the individual. In the 
second tradition, the self is viewed as constituted by, in, and through 
narrative—our own and those of others; without narrative of some form 
or other there is no self. These we will refer to as the epistemic and the 
ontologic positions, respectively. 
The epistemic position is represented by social science research 
that seeks to understand the experience of individuals and groups and is 
akin to the mystery story in which the reader, faced with a series of 
events, facts, places, and people is called to find out “what happened”— 
that is, by the desire to know (see Ryan, 2008). This process is 
encapsulated in Haglund’s (2004) discussion of the elicitation and 
analysis of life histories of adolescents: 
 
I analyzed data by using a modified type of narrative analysis … I 
divided transcripts into narratives, then condensed them into 
adequate paraphrases. The elements of each narrative that the 
participants emphasized most heavily formed the adequate 
paraphrases. I entered the paraphrases into NVivo and coded 
them, eventually revealing themes related to descriptions of 
sexual abstinence and to contextual influences of sexual 
abstinence. (p.1311; emphasis added) 
 
In this approach, the narratives of individuals (or groups) are worked on 
to discover or reveal that which already exists, though hidden or below 
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the surface, the narratives themselves being the means of discovery. The 
pre-existing self is thus made visible, an object of scrutiny and 
surveillance. 
In contrast, the ontologic position understands the self as 
constructed and performed in, by, and through the stories that individuals 
tell about themselves, finding expression in the philosophical works of 
authors such as Ricoeur (1992) and Carr (1991); psychological tracts such 
as Schechtman’s (1996) The Constitution of Selves; and Bruner’s wide- 
ranging works (e.g., 1987a, 1987b, 1990, & 2006). The position is 
encapsulated in Oliver Sacks’ (1998) words: “We have, each of us, a life-
story, an inner narrative—whose continuity, whose sense is our lives. It 
might be said that each of us constructs and lives, a ‘narrative,’ and that 
this narrative is us, our identities” (p.110). But the role of narrative in the 
construction of the self is wider than Sacks’ “inner narrative.” The self is, 
in a deeply Bakhtinian fashion, dialogic (e.g, see Hermans, Kempen, & 
van Loon, 1992; de Peuter, 1998); that is, the self is not simply 
constituted by the individual through an inner narrative but in the 
interaction of the individual with other selves and with wider communal, 
social, and discursive narratives:  
 
I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in 
relation to those conversation partners which are essential to my 
achieving self-definition; in another in relation to those who are 
now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of self-
understanding—and, of course, these classes may overlap. A self 
exists only within what I call “webs of interlocution.” (Taylor, 
1989, p. 36; emphasis added) 
 
These “webs of interlocution,” or what we might term circulating 
narratives, constitute the narrative environment of lived experience.  
While this environment is not deterministic, it is does act as a moulding 
force on the self. To misquote another of Taylor’s (1991) works: “No one 
acquires the [narratives] needed for self-definition on their own” (p. 33). 
This ontologic position seems to be gaining ground in narrative 
research and (though perhaps to a lesser extent) in health and social-care 
practice. This approach forms the basis of our argument in this article and 
so the promotion of narrativity and the creation of narrative unity can be 
seen as part and parcel of pursuing the good life in the Aristotelian sense 
of eudaimonia or human flourishing (see MacIntyre, 1984). 
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In taking this approach, we are not unaware of the criticisms 
leveled against it by authors across disciplines such as Dershowitz (1996) 
from law, Strawson (2004) from philosophy and literary criticism, and 
Tammi (2006) from comparative literature, all of whom view the 
extension of the narrative metaphor to be detrimental to our 
understanding of “real” life. Here is not the place to engage in a thorough 
debate, only to say that the arguments presented by each of these authors 
is undermined by their limited presentations of narrative. Dershowitz 
(1996), for example, criticizes the narrative approach on the grounds that 
not all narratives are dramatic (in the Chekhovian sense), and that life is 
messy with much that is trivial and meaningless:  
 
Everyday life, after all, is rarely structured by the canons of 
dramatic narrative … In real life, most chest pains are indigestion, 
coughs are colds, insurance policies are followed by years of 
premium payments, and telephone calls are from marketing 
services. (pp. 100-101)  
 
While we would agree that not all narratives are dramatic, even in 
the law, within which discipline Dershowitz is writing, this argument can 
go only so far as saying that some stories are mundane—a view with 
which we would agree and which does not undermine our argument that 
life is narrativized. Strawson (2004), from the stance of philosophy and 
literary criticism, opposes narrative as linear and extensive, arguing that 
some people do not experience their life as a narrative whole but 
episodically. Again, we would agree, but this does not undermine our 
argument that life is narrativized; Strawson’s episodicity seems to allow 
for the narrativization of shorter spans of time and events, which are then 
linked, not by an overarching sense of life as story, but in other ways, 
such as links between similar stories, links by meaning, links by people or 
place. Finally, Tammi (2006) is limited by his reliance on sequence and 
point (or moral) as necessary features of narrative. Certainly there are 
stories that demonstrate sequentiality leading to a point (moral), but there 
is nothing inherent in a story that requires this to be so. We are not in 
opposition either to sequentiality or to stories having a point, but to insist 
that a story must have both is to limit one’s appreciation of what 
constitutes a story. By the criteria established by Dershowitz, Strawson, 
and Tammi, many fictional narratives would not pass muster; see, for 
example, Brooke-Rose’s (1975) novel Thru; Saporta’s (2011) book-in-a-
box, Composition No. 1; or Joyce’s (2001) hypertext fiction, Afternoon, a 
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Story. There seems to be little argument that these do, indeed, constitute 
stories. 
 
Narrative and Spirituality 
 
Spirituality, too, can be understood narratively. We do not simply 
experience the spiritual, but what we understand as the spiritual or 
spirituality is framed within layers of narrative. Within the tradition we 
know best, Christianity, story plays an important part in understanding 
God’s role in history and the relationship humans have with God: through 
the story of Christ’s birth, life, death, and resurrection, through the lives 
of the saints, through the stories of the community of believers, and 
through the testimony of individuals. Indeed it is only through 
understanding these stories and accepting the relevance of them to one’s 
life that Christians become Christians: that is, come to understand 
themselves and the world in Christian terms (e.g., Navone, 1977, 1990). 
And while we would not be so arrogant as to speak of the centrality of 
narrative in other faiths, it does strike us that narrative has a role in them, 
in that narratives speak to and of the faithful. In Judaism, for example, the 
rabbinic tradition illustrated by the life and work of Rabbi Shlomo 
Carlebach (Carlebach, 2004); in the teachings of Sufism through song, 
dance, and narrative (Shah, 1993); in Zen Buddhism in koans or 
encounter stories (McRae, 2005); in Raëlism in the origin story of 
extraterrestrial creation (Raël, 2005); and in humanistic spirituality in the 
construction of a vision and the means to realize it (Croft, 2009).  
What links these diverse traditions, at least in our minds, is an 
openness to oneself, in the sense of becoming; heterotelism, or living, at 
least in significant part, for the goals of others (which may also result in 
one’s own development; see Sabat, 2003); exocentricity, or openness to 
the world; and living with transcendence, mystery, and surprise. 
Spirituality, in this sense, is “experienced as being of fundamental or 
ultimate importance and [is] thus concerned with matters of meaning and 
purpose in life, truth, and values” (Cook, 2004, pp.548-549). For Seeber, 
Park, and Kimble (2002), “spirituality is the center or nucleus in human 
experience from which all other dimensions find ultimate meaning” (p. 
76). Of course, the specific expressions of spirituality vary enormously. 
Even within a particular tradition, such as Christianity, spirituality takes a 
number of forms: Protestantism, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and 
evangelicalism (see Demarest, 2012). Within these forms it is possible to 
identify further varying spiritualities; for example, within Catholicism 
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those of the Augustinians, Benedictines, Carmelites, Dominicans, 
Franciscans, and Jesuits, to name but a few. Just as narrative selves are 
unique in their configurations even when the backdrop and narrative 
environment for individuals are similar (as is the case in families), 
spirituality is experienced uniquely and is uniquely framed, even when 
imbued with communal meanings, traditions, rituals, and sacred texts. 
From the admittedly brief discussion above, the parallels between 
the narrative self and narrative spirituality should be obvious: both are 
concerned with meaning-making, and both are framed within narrative 
environments that shape who we are (see Ruffing, 2012). The two 
converge in a number of important ways. First, both act as centres of 
“narrative gravity” around which our lives cohere (Dennett, 1992). While 
the self and spirituality may not have any physical properties and are thus 
not locatable in any meaningful sense, they serve as abstracta—abstract 
objects—that perform certain functions within the frameworks of our 
lives, just as the abstractum “centre of gravity” plays a “nicely defined, 
well delineated and well behaved role within physics” (Dennett, 1992, 
p.103). These abstracta allow us to understand ourselves, others, the 
world, and our place in it. Narrative may serve as the means to integrate 
(or if not integrate, at least help align) Neisser’s (1988) five selves: the 
ecological, the interpersonal, the extended, the private, and the 
conceptual. 
Second, both the narrative self and narrative spirituality are able to 
accommodate the tensions between the competing vectors of 
determinacy, features of existence that act to consolidate who we are 
based on the past, and indeterminacy, the always-present possibility of 
change. The interaction between determinacy and indeterminacy is 
highlighted in spectacular fashion through Stelarc’s (2014) third-ear 
projector; Orlan’s (n.d.) carnal art; or, in the case of transableism, the 
need to move from being able-bodied to disabled (Arfini, 2010), in 
which the determinacy of the body is challenged. Less controversially, the 
interaction is highlighted through forms of psychotherapeutic 
interventions such as cognitive therapy, in which previously determinate, 
irrational cognitions are challenged and replaced by more rational 
thinking (see Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1987) or narrative therapy 
(see Freedman & Combs, 1996; White & Epston, 1990), in which the past 
is rewritten. What makes the discontinuity between these various states 
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Where I change myself, the sort of continuity needed for identity 
may be preserved, even if I become very different. Where I am 
changed wholly by external forces, it is not. This is because the 
sort of continuity needed for what matters to me in my own 
personal identity essentially involves my agency. (p. 123) 
 
Third, both the narrative self and narrative spirituality are highly 
relational, whether those relationships are with other people, God, nature, 
or the cosmos. We are who we are—spiritually or secularly—because of 
the stories we have been born into, and/or have adopted for ourselves. 
Our identities are thus always, in some sense, co-authored narratives. If 
this is so, then the loss of them is not simply unfortunate, but threatening; 
disruption to (or exclusion from) these webs of interlocution risks the 
absolute death of “being unheard, unrecognized, unremembered” 





Narrative loss, it seems, is an inevitable part of aging. As we age, 
we have to adjust to changes in the narrative environment within which 
we constitute our selves—for example, the loss of narrative opportunities 
through the loss of family and friends through death, or the substitution of 
formal, institutional relationships for personal ones through admission 
into long-term residential care—and changes in our own narrative 
capabilities, perhaps through the onset and progression of dementia. To 
be sure, changes in the narrative environment may affect us at any time 
during our lives, but as we age, there seems to be a greater likelihood 
such changes will be as a result of some form of loss. 
Such narrative losses occur at, and impact upon, all levels within 
the narrative environment: the individual, the interpersonal, and the 
societal. At the individual level, we might fall prey to two threats: the first 
is the threat to the self that may be posed by a failing body; the second is 
a self-imposed premature foreclosure of our life story. The first threat, a 
failing or at least vulnerable body, impacts upon the self not only because 
we may no longer be able to do things that we once could, and thus have 
to change our perception of our abilities, but also, at a deeper level, 
because we are embodied selves—that is, we experience our self, others, 
and the world through our bodies (see Atkins, 2008a, 2008b). Thus, 
changes in how our bodies perform directly impacts the selves that we are 
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able to be (see Bullington, 2006, for a discussion of the self and the aging 
body). For example, one of us, over the years, has developed arthritis, 
which forces upon him certain inabilities and behaviours which, in turn, 
prompt him to re-evaluate how he sees himself. For many years he has 
enjoyed walking and has done so without much thought about falling. 
However, with the onset and progression of arthritis, he is now far more 
cautious when walking in the snow, for if he falls, the pain from the shock 
to his arthritic joints far exceeds that from any physical damage resulting 
from the fall itself. His caution is visible in his gait and less visible but 
nonetheless there in the fact that he now carries a mobile phone when out 
walking. This is more than simply a sensible, precautionary act; it is a 
way of being in the world for which he needs to make narrative 
accommodation. For example, his narrations of these shorter, less 
challenging walks include descriptions of uneven ground and weather 
conditions, and accounts of knee pain and his slower pace. In some ways, 
his storying of such walks has become contaminated by the restrictions 
imposed by arthritis.  
The second threat comes from what Freeman (2010) calls 
narrative foreclosure, a form of narrative constraint that limits our 
abilities to be open to what the future might hold or offer. Freeman 
describes four types of narrative foreclosure. First is the dead end, in 
which individuals believe they know how their lives will end and this 
sense of ending shapes their current state. This compares to hearing a joke 
to which you already know the punch line. In the dead end, nothing new 
can arise to take the narrative in another, unanticipated direction. Second 
is the “point of no return” in which individuals feel they have exhausted 
the ability to live meaningfully and their story no longer holds purpose. 
Both of these types are future-oriented foreclosures. Freeman’s third form 
of narrative foreclosure turns to the irrevocability of the past, a view of 
the past as solid, unchangeable, and unforgiving—a past which no 
amount of wishing, hoping, or desiring can change. This is, perhaps, a 
narrative of regret, of paths not taken, of thwarted hopes, desires, and 
plans and a resignation to the fact that one’s life was not as one had 
hoped. Freeman’s fourth form of foreclosure is the extreme of existential 
despair that comes with the sense that nothing can be done to rectify, 
redeem, or reopen one’s story as life flies toward its end. In illustration, 
Freeman quotes from Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich: “There is one bright spot 
there at the back, at the beginning of life, and afterwards all becomes 
blacker and blacker and proceeds more and more rapidly—in inverse ratio 
to the square of the distance from death” (p.11). 
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While Freeman’s four forms of narrative foreclosure speak to how 
individuals view their lives, life events, too, may impact upon our abilities 
to give narrative shape to our lives (and thus our identities). With the 
onset and progression of dementia, for example, the ability to tell a 
coherent, consistent, linear story may be adversely impacted. As 
memories fragment and/or fade, our stories are in danger of becoming 
less internally coherent or consistent; people within our stories may be 
out of place—for instance, now-adult offspring may be storied as little 
children—and the lived experience that becomes the stuff of stories is not 
retained in memory. As gaps become larger, inconsistencies eventually 
make stories impossible to recount; memories of people, events and 
experiences fade, becoming tangled and fragmented. 
At the interpersonal level, we may experience narrative loss in a 
number of ways. Bearing in mind Taylor’s (1989) concept of “webs of 
interlocution,” our narrative self is shaped by the stories that others tell 
about us and by those who populate our stories about ourselves. As we 
age, this web threatens to unravel and strands break as our friends and 
family members die. While those still living may tell stories involving 
those who have died, our narrative environment is impoverished through 
their absence. There can be no more shared experience about which to tell 
mutually authored stories, and of course, the dead can no longer tell 
stories about us. Thus, our web of interlocution is weakened. For 
example, not long ago, the father of one of us died, and while father and 
son did not live on the same continent, they were in frequent, if not daily, 
contact. Through their conversations on Skype, he was linked into family 
stories in the UK, and his father was linked into his in Canada. With his 
father’s death, those narrative threads disappeared. He can now only tell 
stories of his father in the past tense, and his mother and brother no longer 
have his father’s stories of the conversations they had with each other. 
They are all, narratively, the poorer for his passing. 
Our narrative environments may also be impoverished by other 
social changes that restrict the opportunities for us to narrativize our 
experience. For instance, a significant number of older people move from 
living in their own homes to living in long-term care facilities. In effect, 
they move from an environment in which they are embedded in the 
informal narratives of family, friends, and neighbours as well as the 
identity that is shaped by the respective narratives of place, to a totally 
different environment. There, they become embedded in more formal 
narratives of professional-service/user relationships; institutional 
narratives shaped by legal, ethical, and often commercial concerns; and 
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relationships with others who are similarly dislocated from family, 
friends, neighbours, and place. Data on the extent of family visits to 
relatives in long-term care is both sparse and difficult to interpret. In a 
critical review of the literature on family involvement in residential long-
term care, Gaugler (2005) reports: 
 
The existing literature emphasizes that family members remain 
involved in the lives of their relatives following relocation to a 
NH [nursing home], ASL [assisted living facility], or FCH [family 
care home]. While the frequency and duration of visits vary 
somewhat, the data certainly seem to dispute the notion that 
family members leave their loved ones in NHs or similar types of 
institutions to die in isolation. (p.107) 
 
This view would, on the surface, seem to challenge our view that 
the transition to long-term care results in a form of narrative loss. 
Gaugler’s interpretation of the data, however, seems to be somewhat 
optimistic. For example, in support of his conclusion he cites a 
longitudinal study (Kane, Illston, Kane, & Nyman, 1989) in which the 
authors found that of 397 family care home residents and 395 nursing 
home residents in Oregon, 41% and 31%, respectively, reported the 
frequency of family visits in the past few months as “about weekly” 
(Gaugler, 2005, p. 107). This leaves 59% and 69% of residents, 
respectively, with visits of less than “about weekly.” Similarly, Gaugler 
cites Hopp’s (1999) study of informal care provided in board and care, 
which found that of 617 older adult residents, 36.9% had family members 
who visited two to three times per month or more (p. 107). Again, this 
leaves 63.1% who received less than two visits per month from family 
members. Unfortunately, we do not have any data on the extent of contact 
prior to the transition to long-term care to confirm our suspicion that 
contact declines following the transition, but the fact that many residents 
have so few visits does lend some credence to this view. Also supporting 
our argument are the findings of numerous studies, again cited by Gaugler 
(2005), which indicate that “family members' primary purpose in 
remaining involved in the NH was preserving the identity of the 
institutionalized older adult” (p. 108), a finding that supports the view 
that the move to long-term care, and thus into a different narrative 
environment, may threaten one’s identity. 
At the societal level, narrative loss occurs through the dominance 
of what Nelson (2001) calls master narratives—those narratives that 
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“serve as summaries of socially shared understandings” and act as 
“repositories of common norms” (p.6). One such master narrative is that 
which portrays aging as undesirable (witness the growth of anti-aging 
treatments: see Mehlman, Binstock, Juengst, Ponsaran, & Whitehouse, 
2004) and older people as “inflexible, ill, senile, and unproductive” 
(Kane, 2006, p.860). Such ageist attitudes and behaviours are documented 
amongst medical and health care professionals and students, social 
workers and social work students, and criminal justice and law 
enforcement personnel (Kane, 2006). Robert Butler defined ageism as “a 
process of systematic stereotyping and discrimination against people 
because they are old” (cited by Palmore, 1999, p. 4). Underpinning these 
attitudes and behaviours are, first, social factors such as the process of 
modernization that creates “a greater supply of older persons than the 
society needs, by making their job skills obsolete, by increasing 
retirement, by undercutting their prestige as sources of knowledge, and by 
leaving elders behind in rural and deteriorated areas” (Palmore, 1999, p. 
84); and, second, major value orientations of our culture that “tend to 
support negative ageism: active mastery, external world rationalism, 
universalism, and vertical relationships” with aging “threatening 
important outcome values in our culture, such as family security, 
freedom, a comfortable life, happiness, and equal opportunity” (Palmore, 
1999, p. 99).  
Such master narratives serve two purposes. First, they frame the 
stories that are told about older people, creating the narrative space in 
which stories such as those of Robert Lamm, governor of Colorado in the 
1980s, who stated that terminally ill, older adults have “a duty to die and 
get out of the way” (“Gov. Lamm,” 1984), or, more recently, Cooley 
(2007), who argues in the American Journal of Bioethics that the soon-to-
be-demented have a moral duty to commit suicide before they lose their 
dignity as persons. Simmons (1990) identifies three core cultural 
metaphors of aging—aging as physical decline, aging as aesthetic 
distance from youth, and aging as a failure of productivity—and how 
these serve to marginalize older adults. Thompson (2007), in her 
discussion of ageism and spirituality, argues that ageism, operating on the 
personal, cultural, and structural levels, impacts spirituality in old age in 
three key areas: meaning-making, connectedness, and sense of direction 
or purpose. In terms of meaning-making, she says, ageism impacts upon 
how older people see themselves and their fit/lack of fit in the wider 
world; in terms of connectedness, older people may experience social 
isolation or a sense of being outside of the mainstream; and in terms of 
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sense of direction or purpose, “one of the most pernicious effects of 
ageism is to deny older people a future” (p. 174).  
Second, master narratives limit the stories that older people can 
tell about themselves without falling foul of the normative assumptions 
within the master narrative. For example, master narratives impinge on 
stories of sexuality in long-term care facilities; issues related to early or 
delayed retirement (Harbison, Coughlan, Beaulieu, Karabanow, 
VanderPlaat, Wildeman, & Wexler, 2012); and narratives regarding 
health and wellness and financial security (Berkman, Maramaldi, Breon, 
& Howe, 2003). As Laceulle and Baars (2014) write:  
 
Cultural stories and images about aging influence individual aging 
identities, and often impede possibilities for ascribing a positive or 
enriching meaning to later life … Who we are is always partially 
decided by what other people think of us. In this sense identity is 
fundamentally social. Our opportunities to be who we want to be, 
and the way we perceive and experience ourselves, are 
inextricably bound up with our social positioning. We are not free 
to tell any self-narrative we want, since the credibility and 
acknowledgment of our self-narratives depends on the room 
provided by the cultural narratives about the groups we are a part 
of. (p. 36) 
 
The loss of narrativity coupled with the loss of external narrative 
resources and opportunities may serve to fragment the cohesiveness of 
one’s life story and impact adversely the narrative environment in which 




Faced with those who experience narrative loss, it is incumbent 
upon those in the helping professions to help find ways to re-establish a 
viable narrative environment in which individuals might undertake what 
Nelson (2001) calls “narrative repair.” For Nelson, such repair comes 
from generating counter-stories, stories that attempt to shift oppressive 
master narratives (such as those of ageism, in our example) and, indeed, 
we would share such a concern. Here we want to focus on five general 
features that contribute to such counter-storying in the context of aging 
and narrative loss: the provision of narrative opportunity, the promotion 
of narrative literacy, the creation or reignition of narrative desire, the 
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making of narrative connections, and the generation of autobiographical 
reasoning. 
 
The Provision of Narrative Opportunity 
 
If much narrative loss in aging follows from the loss of narrative 
opportunity—for example, the losses incumbent upon the death of family 
and friends, the moving away of younger family members, retirement, 
physical impairment and so on—then an obvious means by which to 
ameliorate or overcome such losses is to provide opportunities for older 
adults to generate and participate in new stories: in particular, experiences 
that promote experiential and cognitive growth, involving “humanistic 
concerns like the importance of doing personally meaningful activities, 
cultivating personally meaningful relationships, and contributing to the 
development of society and future generations” (Bauer, 2010, p.68). One 
example of such an opportunity might be the “adopt a grandparent” 
projects in which families without grandparents and older adults without 
grandchildren (or those whose children and grandchildren have moved 
away) are partnered, providing young children with the opportunities to 
develop relationships with older adults and opportunities for older adults 
to be part of, and contribute to, ongoing family stories. Similarly, the 
development of “storymaps”—maps of neighbourhoods that integrate the 
stories of the young and old, meanings and places, and change and 
continuity—may serve to enhance community and generate engagement 
(e.g., the Regent Park Storymap, 2014-2015). The forms of narrative 
opportunities that are possible are manifold, limited only by the desire of 
participants to engage with one another and one another’s stories. 
However, narrative opportunity is not enough on its own. In order to 
effectively forestall narrative loss, we need also to develop our ability to 




In order to be able to work effectively with individuals through 
narrative, it is important to develop one’s own narrative literacy (see 
Baldwin, 2010). By this, we mean the ability to recognize the nature of 
narrative, to understand the process of storytelling, to locate individual 
stories in a wider context, and to develop a pool of narrative resources on 
which to draw. 
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Taking our lead from Plummer (1995), we believe that it is 
important to be able to identify the nature of narrative. Some narratives 
serve to constrain, limit, oppress, and disempower ourselves and others; 
other narratives serve to extend, transcend, liberate, and empower. This is 
clearly seen in narrative therapy’s focus on moving the individual from a 
problem-centred story to an alternative, more functional story (see White 
& Epston, 1990), but is also part and parcel of Nelson’s view of the 
dynamic between master narratives and counter-stories (Nelson, 2001). 
For our purposes, we might ask: To what degree does the story express an 
openness to becoming, a heterotelic orientation, an exocentric approach to 
the world, and a realization and embrace of transcendence, mystery, and 
surprise? 
A second element in narrative literacy is the understanding of the 
process of storytelling. When first told, a story often lacks the polish of 
stories frequently told. Indeed, when first told, stories might appear 
comparatively inarticulate, stumbling over the events on which they are 
based and the interpretations that can (or should) be attributed. The 
movement toward a more polished, more finished story (though bearing 
in mind that all stories are ultimately unfinished in that they can always 
be retold or rewritten) may follow what Tilley (1992) calls a “plot snake,” 
a plot trajectory which captures increasing coherency and order while 
appreciating the forces acting against them. This increasing coherency 
and order can be encouraged in a number of ways. First, they can be 
encouraged through the retelling of key stories, since “significant and 
complex experiences do not yield their meaning in one narration” 
(Ruffing, 2011, p.107). Even when a story appears relatively polished, it 
may be worth having the individual retell it so as draw out possible 
alternative meanings. Kimble (1993), for example, describes his own 
“journey of aging” as punctuated by a number of spiritually significant 
milestones, and in later life finds himself “engaged in more reflection and 
teasing out of meanings of my life from the ‘storehouse of the past.’ A 
configuration, a mosaic of meanings, begins to take shape and leads me 
forward into the present and to the very precipice of the future” (p. 27). In 
this way, we can disrupt the premature foreclosure of a narrative that 
seems to serve to constrain or limit the individual whose story it is. 
Second, as all stories are selective in what they present, we may want to 
attempt to elicit three forms of the unsaid (see Ruffing, 2011): “through 
seeking further details about the story being told thus revealing further 
meanings and possibilities for the story; by drawing attention to what has 
been backgrounded in the story, thus ‘inviting the “unsaid”’ into explicit 
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awareness” (p. 120); and by identifying the clues or secrets that remain 
unsaid so that these may be, at some point, integrated into the rest of our 
stories. In these ways, it is possible to elicit other possible tellings and 




Narrative desire, according to Brooks (1984), is the desire to keep 
reading, though we do not need to embrace Brooks’ alignment of such a 
desire with Freud’s understanding of desire as Eros. For our purposes, it 
is enough to say that narrative desire is, simply, the desire to know how a 
story turns out. It is the desire that keeps us turning the pages of a novel; 
it is the desire expertly created by masterful authors of detective or 
mystery novels. In succumbing to this desire, the reader is seduced into 
engaging with the text. We are, again according to Brooks (1984), driven 
to read as part of our desire to find meaning in, and construct order from, 
the apparent chaos of experience. 
While narrative desire is what keeps us interested in the story, if 
the story ends too soon we feel, at some level, cheated, or at least 
unfulfilled. The space between the beginning of the narrative and its 
closure is referred to by Barthes (1974) as “dilatory space,” a space 
characterised by delay, deferral, and displacement, “a pressure toward 
meaning [but] which is never pinned down or captured” (Brooks, 1984, p. 
56). 
When Freeman (2010) writes of narrative foreclosure, he is, to all 
intents and purposes, writing about the premature ending of a story that 
leaves us feeling cheated. Life goes on, but the dilatory space that 
generates the pressure toward meaning no longer exists. How, then, can 
narrative desire and the means to resist narrative foreclosure be 
regenerated? We propose that the regeneration might be achieved through 




Although we have focused above on the importance of a sense of 
linearity, cohesiveness, and coherency, individuals do not always initially 
present their stories in this fashion. Sometimes, we are faced with 
fragments of narratives, or out-of-place stories, or stories that seem 
unrelated to each other—in other words, stories that do not fit the 
Aristotelian ideal of having a beginning, middle, and end. When faced 
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with such stories, it is important to be able to see beyond the immediate 
presentation to appreciate how what is being recounted may connect with 
other stories (complete or incomplete) in order to create meaning, or with 
other fragments to generate more easily recognizable stories. Thus we see 
Bamberg’s (e.g., 2004) work linking small stories with the performance 
of identity amongst adolescents, or Boje’s (2009) organizational story 
fragments containing, in holographic fashion, more complete stories. We 
see such narrative connectivity in Ruffing’s (2011) description of spiritual 
direction in which the spiritual director encourages the directee to re-
experience the events of the story with emotional power and to appreciate 
the experience more fully, making links with other stories and aspects of 
life. Further, through the discernment of stories, the director encourages 
the directee to examine the many storylines that are contained within the 
directee’s life, linking the inner story of the directee’s experience to outer 
stories drawn from cultural templates. Ruffing puts it this way: 
 
Directees absorb stories from films; from celebrities; from 
confessional talk shows on every imaginable subject; from plots 
of sitcoms, soap operas, and other television shows; from many 
written forms of personal narratives; and from cultural templates. 
These stories often define success in terms of financial status; they 
define self-worth in terms of sexual attraction or display; they 
define the use of force in terms of the only way to resolve conflict; 
they define the violence of human rights and civil liberties in 
terms of a necessity to calm fear. These stories live inside us right 
along with the stories of our faith. (p.115)  
 
In making the connections between our personal stories and these 
wider, ideological narratives that shape our desires and thus our identities, 
the possibility of identifying conflicts is generated, and with this, the 
possibility of choosing to resist these metanarratives and instead author 
one that more properly aligns with our experience and our desires. For 
example, the dominant story of aging as senescence, or as something to 
be resisted (witness the plethora of anti-aging cosmetics) may be replaced 
in our personal stories by connections to stories that generate challenge 
and aspiration such as the Dark Horse Venture (2013), the activism of the 
Raging Grannies (n.d.), and the celebratory performances of The 
Zimmers (Probably, 2007).  
In so doing, the directee can be aided to recognize conflicts 
between stories, or how some stories (for example, that of aging as 
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senescence) “restrict our imaginations, our desires, and, consequently, our 
actions” (Ruffing, 2011, p.115). Narrative connections can thus both 
strengthen our personal narratives and generate the space in which to 





A second means by which to generate narrative desire and to resist 
narrative foreclosure is through the promotion of autobiographical 
reasoning. Autobiographical reasoning is the active process of developing 
a coherent life story, and thus identity, by linking together the past, 
present, and future through establishing a coherent sequence of temporal 
events, connecting overarching themes, and developing causal coherence 
(Habermas, 2011). Autobiographical reasoning is thus a means by which 
individuals constitute themselves through the narrative lens they use to 
construct their life story and bind together their fundamental values, 
meanings, truths, and purposes. As Conway (1998) suggests: 
 
If we remember the past as a series of chaotic events governed by 
an impersonal and nonmoral fate or luck, we create a similar kind 
of future in our mind’s eye, and that prophecy is usually self-
fulfilling. If we see the past as fully determined—by economic 
forces, by genetic codes, even by birth order, and relationships 
with parents—we see ourselves as victims of those forces, with 
our best hope a kind of stoic resignation. If we see our past as a 
moral spiritual journey in time, our imagined future will continue 
that quest. (p. 176) 
 
Kimble (1990) argues that we can give meaning to our lives by 
realizing our values. Citing Frankl, Kimble indicates three sets of values 
that give meaning: creative values, experiential values, and attitudinal 
values. If we see ourselves on “a moral spiritual journey in time,” then we 
might continue this quest through the telling of “values histories,” such as 
those outlined by Gibson (1990), histories that seek to inform others of 
what is important in one’s life, such as relationships, autonomy, and 
attitudes towards life, dying, and death. Such values histories, although an 
idea developed for use with older adults in long-term care, as a second 
generation form of advance directive providing others with a more solid 
basis on which to make decisions for the older person should that person 
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lack capacity (Rich, 1996), could be adapted for use with older adults 
more generally as a means of reflecting on their lives. By asking older 
adults to recount stories in which they realized their values or maintained 
their beliefs in the face of adversity is a means by which it is possible to 
link identity and spirituality through the meaning-making of narrative. 
Telling stories of how we lived up to those beliefs or values that we 
professed, and how those beliefs and attitudes both changed and changed 
us over time, enables us to see our past as “a moral spiritual journey,” and 
thus prepares us for the future. 
Sequencing events in time is essential to creating meaning based 
on a linear progression to understand their relationship, attribute 
causality, and attach meaning (Bohn, 2011). This does not mean that one 
recounts events in the temporal order in which they occurred, but that 
underlying the narrative is a temporal order within which those events 
have a place. For example, while one might recount one’s experience of 
divorce before talking about one’s marriage, it makes no sense to talk 
about divorce if one had not previously been married. This underlying 
temporal order creates one frame of reference within which the story 
makes sense. A second frame of reference is constituted by establishing 
overarching themes of similarity and continuity between stories, themes 
or tropes that provide an overall framework for one’s life narrative (Bohn, 
2011). By identifying oneself as a parent, a spouse, an employee, or a 
teammate, individuals position themselves within a cultural context in 
relation to the other common themes of life. Causal coherence is the act 
of reasoning and attaching meaning to past events in order to emplot the 
stories that give shape to one’s identity and life story (Bohn, 2011). 
Autobiographical reasoning thus offers depth beyond remembering an 
event by the amount of cognitive effort, construction, and interpretation 
involved in developing a relevant coherent life story and binding together 
what is fundamental in our lives. Actively constructing memories is a 
critical process of intentional reasoning which serves both to develop a 
sense of identity and a source of continuity (McLean & Fournier, 2008; 
McLean & Mansfield, 2011) and a sense of becoming or transcendence in 
which the story links us with others, the world, and, perhaps, a sense of 
mystery. This observation aligns with what Randall and Kenyon (2001) 
call “biographical” (as compared to biological) aging—a deeper 











The stories we tell give meaning to our experiences and our lives. 
Narrative allows us to make meaning and to discover and reclaim our 
spirituality by coalescing our understanding of self, of others, and of 
where we fit in the world. The storytelling process is, we believe, 
fundamental to developing or constructing a viable sense of self, a self 
that does not simply drift through the flux of life but one that seeks to 
establish meaning and purpose, realize values and, at least on a small 
scale, establish truth.  
Through narrative, we piece together our connected stories and 
weave together our own meaningful truths. The dynamic between our 
stories of our selves, and those others tell about us, shapes who we are 
and who we might become. Physical aging, life events, and normative 
values and beliefs all may act to constrain this process, potentially 
resulting in narrative loss. This loss can be resisted through narrative 
repair and counter-storying master narratives. Narrative points to the 
future, through the trajectory of its plot and through the narrative 
imagination of the narrator. Narrative can make and consolidate 
relationships through jointly told stories and the connections between 
stories of individuals, groups, and communities. Stories locate us in time 
and place, and thus provide a home. Keeping the storytelling and 
storylistening processes alive, linking experience with meaning, truth, 
values, and purpose is, we believe, of spiritual import, for without it, life 
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